Resources
Identity Use Cases & Scenarios.
FIDIS Deliverables.
Identity of Identity.
Interoperability.
Profiling.
Forensic Implications.
HighTechID.
D3.1: Overview on IMS.
D3.2: A study on PKI and biometrics.
D3.3: Study on Mobile Identity Management.
D3.5: Workshop on ID-Documents.
D3.6: Study on ID Documents.
D3.7: A Structured Collection on RFID Literature.
D3.8: Study on protocols with respect to identity and identification – an insight on network protocols and privacy-aware communication.
D3.9: Study on the Impact of Trusted Computing on Identity and Identity Management.
D3.10: Biometrics in identity management.
D3.11: Report on the Maintenance of the IMS Database.
D3.15: Report on the Maintenance of the ISM Database.
D3.17: Identity Management Systems – recent developments.
D12.1: Integrated Workshop on Emerging AmI Technologies.
D12.2: Study on Emerging AmI Technologies.
D12.3: A Holistic Privacy Framework for RFID Applications.
D12.4: Integrated Workshop on Emerging AmI.
D12.5: Use cases and scenarios of emerging technologies.
D12.6: A Study on ICT Implants.
D12.7: Identity-related Crime in Europe – Big Problem or Big Hype?.
D12.10: Normality Mining: Results from a Tracking Study.
Privacy and legal-social content.
Mobility and Identity.
Other.
IDIS Journal.
FIDIS Interactive.
Press & Events.
In-House Journal.
Booklets
Identity in a Networked World.
Identity R/Evolution.
D3.9: Study on the Impact of Trusted Computing on Identity and Identity Management
Related Work and Current Problems
Current systems used for automated provisioning of applications and IT resources make use of IdM systems to provide access control over the resources.
One of the cornerstones of any IMS lies in its security. According to the IMS Types defined in 8.2, the security mechanisms used for an IMS could be different. On the other hand, the protection of a user’s identity from identity theft also relies heavily on the security mechanisms whether on the user’s specific platform, web interfaces, communication protocols or remote platforms and databases. Unfortunately, trusted infrastructures are not commonly used nowadays for identity management systems. In fact, current identity management solutions lack hardware security support.
For example, digital signatures are an important example for identity management applications. Although the legal prerequisites for digital signatures (at least in Europe) exist, in a big scale applications do not so far.
Digital signatures face several problems, mainly low acceptance due to low security for the user. In case an attacker manages to fake a user’s digital signature, the user will find himself having to prove that he did not sign. Therefore, digital signatures need tamper proof devices that require users to authenticate themselves. But as long as this authentication is not safe from e.g. an attacker stealing a password, the user still faces the shifting of the burden of proof. Furthermore, the problem of “What-You-See-Is-What-You-Sign” is not a trivial one, so users are required to have a certain level of expertise to be able to judge whether they are tricked or not, and even experts might fail. One can never be sure if one really signs what one can see, but has to trust the applications, the hardware (and their developers).
Some initiatives for supporting identity management with TC already exist. For example, in [123], the author proposes to use TC to establish a level of trust between different identity domains, in a way to allow one credential provider in one identity domain to issue credentials to be used for authentication in another identity domain based on a pre-defined credential issuing policy.
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