Resources
- Identity Use Cases & Scenarios.
- FIDIS Deliverables.
- Identity of Identity.
- Interoperability.
- Profiling.
- Forensic Implications.
- HighTechID.
- D3.1: Overview on IMS.
- D3.2: A study on PKI and biometrics.
- D3.3: Study on Mobile Identity Management.
- D3.5: Workshop on ID-Documents.
- D3.6: Study on ID Documents.
- D3.7: A Structured Collection on RFID Literature.
- D3.8: Study on protocols with respect to identity and identification – an insight on network protocols and privacy-aware communication.
- D3.9: Study on the Impact of Trusted Computing on Identity and Identity Management.
- D3.10: Biometrics in identity management.
- D3.11: Report on the Maintenance of the IMS Database.
- D3.15: Report on the Maintenance of the ISM Database.
- D3.17: Identity Management Systems – recent developments.
- D12.1: Integrated Workshop on Emerging AmI Technologies.
- D12.2: Study on Emerging AmI Technologies.
- D12.3: A Holistic Privacy Framework for RFID Applications.
- D12.4: Integrated Workshop on Emerging AmI.
- D12.5: Use cases and scenarios of emerging technologies.
- D12.6: A Study on ICT Implants.
- D12.7: Identity-related Crime in Europe – Big Problem or Big Hype?.
- D12.10: Normality Mining: Results from a Tracking Study.
- Privacy and legal-social content.
- Mobility and Identity.
- Other.
- IDIS Journal.
- FIDIS Interactive.
- Press & Events.
- In-House Journal.
- Booklets
- Identity in a Networked World.
- Identity R/Evolution.
D3.6: Study on ID Documents
After having read the Report of the LSE Identity Project, Niels Bjergstrom developed criteria for the design of eID systems which will be mentioned briefly in this section. He proposes the following as some necessary criteria (yet not comprehensive):
The Root Identity of a person in the digital world should be an irrefutable electronically readable document with the following properties:
It must present an irrefutable link between its user and itself.
It must be able to participate in authorisation procedures without leaking any identity information (“Is this individual allowed to do this in this context?”).
It should be able to facilitate authentication processes without compromising identity - allowing anonymity or pseudonymity most of the time is a fundamental requirement of any eID system in a free society.
It should be able to uniquely represent (exactly) the legitimate holder in public key cryptographic protocols.
It should be able to participate in identification processes if identification is required and legitimate.
It must not depend on irreplaceable personal characteristics to cope with the problem of compromised or lost/changed characteristics.
The token containing the eID must be replaceable without unwanted consequences, i.e. theft or loss of a token must not enable impersonation.
All its functions, including any disclosure of information in the token, must be fully controlled by the owner.
Niels Bjergstrom (Bjergstrom 2005) proposes an approach where the linkage between eID and user is performed by DNA which thereby is the basis of eIDs without leaking information or compromising personal details. In any case he sees the necessity for a system which is as decentralised as possible, building on information inside the eID token.
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